Causality and causation have troubled philosophers at least since the time of Aristotle. Aristotle himself notes that pre-Socratic philosophers were likewise concerned with causality. Contemporary discussions of causality find its impetus in Hume, who concentrated on causal relations between events (i.e. Aristotle’s efficient causality).

The main reason for the quest to clarify causation concerns its implications for other philosophical issues. Indeed, clarity regarding causation is utterly vital for clarity in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, as well as the philosophy of logic, to name a few (1). For example, an inquiry into causation within the realm of the philosophy of science has manifold repercussions, of which the lawfulness of nature, as well as the nature of time are but two. 

Brand argues for a reductive (i.e. systemic or realist) theory of causation (6). Moreover, Brand argues that Hume viewed as possible having extra-systemic causation, and the J.S. Mill likewise taught that extra-systemic causation (non-reductive, i.e.) was at least possible. Brand argues, however, that no fully fleshed-out account of extra-systemic causation is available, and that when one belies a pure systemic causal network, causal talk itself in abandoned and left unintelligible (6).

Hume posits, in essence, in his TREAT, the following three proposals re: causation: For every event e and every event f, e caused f, if and only if:

1). e occurred before the occurrence of f.

2). e occurred in the immediate geographic area of f; and

3). Every time a similar event to e occurred, f likewise occurred after it.

Brand takes issue with Hume regarding posit #1, as do I, as well (6). It is indeed possible that looking at the world through a panentheistically informed pneumatological position, that the cause and the effect could be coterminous with one another, and not sequentially follow or precede the other. Look at the example of a seesaw; King goes down while Kate goes up. If the seesaw is inelastic, there is a bonafide case of simultaneous causation, as neither instance (King or Kate) caused the other (i.e. either going up or going down). In such a case of simultaneous causation, neither the cause nor the effect can be distinguished from one another.

Additionally, the well documented case given by Thomas Reid is a problem for Humean causation. Reid propounded that Hume’s definition of causation did not allow for the differentiation of genuine causation from accidental correlation. For example, Reid noted that just because the day always followed the night, that does not mean that the night caused the day. 

In a note possibly applicable later to SDC, ceteris paribus clauses stipulate that external factors are irrelevant, and that one should focus merely upon the initial conditions (perhaps this has implications also with and for chaos theory?).

C. J. Ducasse, “Critique of Hume’s Analysis”, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 67-76.

Many philosophers are dissatisfied with Hume’s definition of causation, of which Mill’s failed to improve (Ducasse, 67). However, Hume’s still is the most influential account of causation. Hume’s greatest contribution to the philosophy of causation is not that he solved the problems of causation insomuch as he raised the questions and made the philosophical problems of causation readily apparent (Ducasse, 68). Ducasse claims that Hume’s “official” view is that there is no connection perceived between cause and effect, and that therefore there is none (Ducasse, 68). Ducasse stipulates that Hume’s view of causality – in that it is mere succession – represents an incorrect analysis of the ordinary notion of cause (Ducasse, 69). Indeed, Hume’s notion of cause and effect fits entirely with some relations between two events wherein the relationship is not one of cause and effect, but mere accidental association instead (Ducasse, 70). For example, in infants the growth of hair is regularly followed by the growth of teeth, but these two events are not linked by a causal relation. Thus, constant conjunction, in and of itself, is not a valid criteria with which to determine causal relations. Rather, it is often popularly conceived in science, for example (and correctly, I might add), that the cause of some change in a situation is the change itself which is introduced to the situation. Hume himself cedes this notion within his Treatise (pg. 104-105) when he writes, “we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances.” How can a single experiment, for Hume, be constitutive of full proof? I understand not his logic here, for if causation can be adduced by a single experiment, then it logically follows that constant conjunction is NOT constitutive of causation, contra Hume’s prior asseverations. 

“The Logical Character of Scientific Laws”, Ernest Nagel, pgs. 79-110, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976).

A prima facie distinction must be made and maintained between “lawlike” statements and mere universal statements (i.e., all screws rust versus all screws are rusty).

Laws of nature are often only arbitrarily designated as such, and as a consequence, they are often vague in their demarcations (81). Does a law of nature merely designate an accidental universality? A law posits a stronger connection between antecedent and consequent conditions than do mere matter-of-fact concomitance (83). For a “law” to be truly be such, Nagel states, there must be an element of necessity involved within the consequent of the antecedent (be it logical, casual, physical or real). Moreover, A.C. Ewing has written that, “[t]he cause logically entails the effect in such a way that it would be in principle possible, with sufficient insight, to see what kind of effect must follow from examination of the cause alone without having learnt by previous experience what were the effects of similar causes” (“Mechanical and Teleological Causation”, Aristotelian Society Supplemental Vol. 14, 1935, pg. 66). But I, Bradford, reject this statement outright, as my panentheistically informed pneumatological position of the God-world relationship would reject this for multiple possibilities are preserved even considering initial conditions. Moreover, I reject such reasoning because if the “laws” of nature are logically necessary, then positive science inquiry is engaged in fruitless activity when it seeks experimental and observational evidence for a posited law. 

Further, in rejection of the Humean analyses of nomic universality, one is quote correct in stating that de facto universals cannot support subjunctive conditionals (100).

Most causal imputations, in everyday affairs, do not contain reference to each and every sufficient condition for the occurrence of the effect. Rather, more commonly elucidated is the one causal event that completes the necessary set of sufficient conditions (106). 

Nagel elucidates 4 types of “laws”. First, “natural kinds” of laws refer to determinable characteristics and/or properties of various substances. Second, “sequential order” laws refer to the sequence in which activities occur (with the subsets of developmental or historical). Third, “statistical laws”, commonly used in biological and social sciences, refer to probability(ies) relations between events and properties. Fourth, “functional laws”, commonly used in mathematical and physical sciences, refer to the functional dependence between two properties or between two processes (Nagel, 107-109).

“Causation”, R.G. Collingwood, pages 169-211, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976).

There are 3 senses of the word “cause”: the historical, the human point of view, and the natural (169). At this juncture, I project that SDC may be referring to “cause” in the sense numbered 1 above, for the historical causes are composed of both casua quod (efficient cause) and causa ut (final cause), according to Collingwood (176). A cause in sense 2 above is never able to produce the corresponding effect alone (185). Moreover, a cause in sense 2 is conditional, whereas a cause in sense 1 & sense 2 is unconditional. J.S. Mill defined a cause in sense 3, and as that thing which is the invariable antecedent of its effect (185). 

The Liber de Causis, a Neoplatonic Arabic work of the ninth century, stipulates that God created certain instruments for the realization of certain ends, and thereby confers upon these instruments a manner of power(hence imago dei), which similar to His own, is nonetheless inferior to it (208). Endowed, then, with powers of the godhead, these instruments accordingly acquire the character of causes, which correspondingly are both created and creative at once (208).

“Necessity in Causation”, Brand Blashard, pgs. 226-253, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976).  

Causation is important for at least four reasons: 1). it is a relation, 2). It is an instrument of control, 3). It is an instrument of understanding, and 4). It points to a network of objectives ties beyond human faculty(ies).

Blashard gives me a nice term to use with my SDC theory: “precipitating cause”. It may be that this precipitating cause is in relation to efficient causes…

J.S. Mills was quite astute in noting that the “real cause of the phenomenon is the assemblage of all its conditions” (Mills, System of Logic, Bk. III, Ch. 5, Sec. 3). This seems to reinforce the notion recounted above by Nagel (106) in that most causal imputations, in everyday affairs, do not contain reference to each and every sufficient condition for the occurrence of the effect. Rather, more commonly elucidated is the one causal event that completes the necessary set of sufficient conditions.

In a world wherein causation involves necessity, how could any variation, any errors, or even any inconsistencies result at all (242). This is an excellent point, one that SDC needs to pick up and run with….

“The Logic of Causal Propositions”, Arthur Burks, pgs. 257-276, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976).

Perhaps, using the terminology gained in part by Burks here, SDC could unpack the “causal implications” of potentialities in causation. This would entail SDC to NOT be exclusively causally sufficient. 

“Causation”, Richard Taylor, in Myles Brand, ed. The Nature of Causation (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976),  pgs. 287-305:

Plato averred that God did not create the chaos with which he then formed the world from. Contra Plato, I posit that god did create the chaos with which he then formed the world from, but just not simultaneously with its creation (hence I do deny creation ex nihilo as currently propounded). 

In ancient ideas of efficient causation, one finds the closely related concepts of power (or efficacy) and necessity (or compulsion), according to Taylor (280). The ancient notion of causation, as affirmed by Taylor (283), is closer to the truth than are many modern manifestations of the same. In efficient causation, as propounded by SDC, power is essential, but necessity of relations is not. Thus, causation is not merely the constancy of sequence, but has a power component to it as well. Unfortunately, it seems that most modern and postmodern philosophers have eschewed the notion of efficient causation. Moreover, modern philosophers aver that the only difference between cause and effect is one of temporal succession, and not any notion of power or efficacy (296). The cause of an event, according to Taylor, is now almost universally supposed to be some condition or set of conditions that temporally precedes some other in time (296). But in many instances of causation, the causes do not precede the effects in time, but are entirely contemporaneous with them instead (297).What does seem to universally distinguish a “cause” from its effect is that the former is something that acts upon the later (305).

In the traditional paradigm of causation, and even unto today, one tenet of efficient causality has not been attacked: the notion that the power of an efficient cause never extends to things past (Taylor, 281). I wonder if a proleptic panentheistically informed pneumatological understanding of the God-world relation (i.e. my SDC) would affirm this statement of Taylor’s to be true. Taylor states that the priority of efficient causes to their effects is a “metaphysical necessity” (281). The present contains real possibilities and real potentialities, as well as alternatives that are mutually incompatible with each other. 

Taylor asserts that the notion of power needs to receive more attention in modern formulations of causation (283). Earlier metaphysicians equated power (or efficacy) with that which was the active component in causation, and its effect was shown on the passive component of the causation. 

Mere constant conjunction, even with temporal contiguity, does not constitute causation (Taylor, 284). Hume’s analysis, at the end of the day, does not allow one to properly distinguish between cause and effect (295). It is more apropos to state that the cause of any one event is a set of conditions that are in sum necessary and sufficient, but in singular appearance. 

“Causes and Conditions”, J.L. Mackie, pgs. 308-333:

An important point from Mackie is the entailments of an INUS condition: and insufficient but necessary part of a condition which itself is unnecessary but sufficient for the result (309). 

Micael Scriven writes that: “Causes are not necessary, even contingently so, [and] they are not sufficient – but they are, to talk that language, contingently sufficient… They are part of a set of conditions that does not guarantee the outcome, and they are non-redundant in that the rest of this set (which does not include all the other conditions present) is not alone sufficient for the outcome. It is not even true that they are relatively necessary with regard to that set of conditions rather than the total circumstances of their occurrence, for there may be many possible replacements for them which happen not to be present. There remains a ghost of necessity, a cause is a factor from a set of possible factors the presence of one of which (any one) is necessary in order that a set of conditions actually present be sufficient for the effect.”

 1 Michael Scriven, in his review of Nagel’s “The Structure of Science”, in Review of Metaphysics, 1964, pg 408, emphasis in original.

¹ Bart, W.M., ED. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, (PUBLISHER, YEAR?). pg. 123

² Nidditch, Peter H., ed. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), 195.

³ Luce, A. A. and T. E. Jessop, eds. The Works of George Berkley Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2 (London: Nelson, 1948), 160.

⁴ Hume writes, “Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity, and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact” (ENQ, pg. 27)

⁵ Whitehead, The Interpretation of Science, 119-119

⁶ Whitehead, The Interpretation of Science, 57.

⁷ Alexander , Space, Time, and Deity, 290.

⁸ Alexander , Space, Time, and Deity, 294